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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

ALAN B. THOMAS, JR. (directly and
derivatively in his capacity as a
shareholder of LecStar Corporation)
and HEATHER McFARLAND (directly
and derivatively in her capacity as a
shareholder of LecStar Corporation),

)(

)(
)(
)(
)(

)(
)(
)(

Plaintiffs,

)(

v.

)(

)(
)(
)(

JOHN C. CANOUSE,
STEPHEN M. HICKS, SOUTH RIDGE
W. DALE SMITH, CACHE CAPITAL
(USA), L.P., ATLANTIS CAPITAL
FUND, LTD., and McCORMACK
AVENUE, LTD.,

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 2004-CV-88793

)(
)(

)(
)(

)(
Defendants,

)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(

v.
LECSTAR CORPORATION,

)(

as a Nominal Defendant.

---------------------------)(
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ADD
S. LAIRD ELLIS, '" AND FRANCOISE ELLIS AS PLAINTIFFS
On November 16, 2009, Counsel appeared before the Court to present
oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion to Add S. Laird Ellis, III and Francoise Ellis as
Plaintiffs. After hearing the arguments made by counsel, and reviewing the briefs
submitted on the motions and the record in the case, the Court finds as follows.
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Background
This motion to add plaintiffs arises out of a pending settlement through
which Plaintiffs, Alan B. Thomas, Jr. and Heather McFarland would settle their
direct claims with Defendants. The settlement calls for Plaintiffs Thomas and
McFarland to transfer their Lecstar Corporation ("Lecstar" or "the Corporation")
shares to certain Defendants. Any such settlement would mean that these
Plaintiffs would no longer be shareholders of Lecstar and, therefore, would lose
standing to pursue derivative claims on behalf of the Corporation. To avoid harm
to Lecstar and its other shareholders, before approving any such settlement, the
Court permitted Plaintiffs Thomas and McFarland to file a motion to add plaintiffs,
and on September 11, 2009, they filed a motion pursuant to D.C.G.A. 9-11-21 to
add two new Plaintiffs, S. Laird Ellis, III and Francoise Ellis (the "Ellises").
In opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to add the Ellises, the South ridge
Defendants argue that these potential plaintiffs should not be added because
they do not have standing to sue. These Defendants contend that the Ellises
lack standing because (1) they cannot fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the Corporation, (2) they "failed to comply with the statutory demand
requirements for bringing derivative claims," and (3) their claims are barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.

Standard
Under Georgia law, "[P]arties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just." D.C.G.A. § 9-11-21. "The determination of whether a
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party should be added to a lawsuit lies within the discretion of the trial court, and
that determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse."
Ellison v. Hill, 288 Ga. App. 415, 418 (2007).

Substantive Law
The Parties do not dispute that Texas substantive law controls this case.
Texas law provides that "[A] shareholder may not commence or maintain a
derivative proceeding unless the shareholder: (1) was a shareholder of the
corporation at the time of the act or omission complained of or became a
shareholder by operation of law from a person that was a shareholder at that
time; and (2) fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in
enforcing the right of the corporation." V.A.T.S. Bus. Corp. Act, Art. 5.14 (b).

Fair and Adequate Representation of Corporate Interests
As the Court noted in its January 16, 2009,Order on Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, a trial court must decide whether a shareholder
adequately represents the interests of the corporation, and that decision will not
be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
Inc., 651 F.2d 1030, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981). A plaintiff in a shareholder derivative
action must not have ulterior motives and must not be pursuing an external
th

personal agenda. Smith v. Ayres, 977 F.2d 946,949 (5 Cir. 1992). The
South ridge Defendants argue that the Ellises' earlier attempt to settle the
derivative suit demonstrates a "conflict of interest" rendering them unable to
adequately represent the interests of the Corporation. However, the Court finds
that the Ellises have attempted to settle the derivative claims, not merely for
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themselves, but for all of the remaining Lecstar shareholders who are not
affiliated with the Defendants. The Court finds that this does not evidence a
conflict of interest. In addition, the Court finds that there is no evidence that the
Ellises "interests are antagonistic to those [they are] seeking to represent."
Williams v. Service Corp. International, 218 Ga.App. 10, 11,459 S.E.2d 621,622
(Ga. App. 1995). Nor is there any evidence that their attempt to settle did not
have the best interest of the other shareholders in mind.
The South ridge Defendants point to Hornreich v. Plant Industries, Inc.,
535 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1976), as authority for the proposition that attempts to
settle a derivative claim render a shareholder inadequate to represent their
corporation. In that case, the potential plaintiff had been fired as a result of a
dispute with the very same entity that he sought to represent and had also used
the threat of suit as leverage to settle his other claims. kL at 551. Thus,
Hornreich is distinguishable from the facts in this case.
The South ridge Defendants cite several factors that courts consider when
determining whether a proposed derivative plaintiff can adequately and fairly
represent a corporation. Citing Rothenberg v. Security Mgmt. Co., Inc., 667 F.2d
958,961 (11th Cir. 1982), the factors the South ridge Defendants raise are: (1)
indications that the plaintiff is not the true party in interest, (2) the degree of
control exercised by the attorneys over the litigation, (3) the plaintiff's
unfamiliarity with the litigation and unwillingness to learn about the suit, (4) the
lack of any personal commitment to the action on the part of the representative
plaintiff, and (5) the degree of support received by the plaintiff from other
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shareholders. The South ridge Defendants give great weight to the second factor
and argue that the "degree of control exercise by the [Plaintiffs'] attorneys over
the litigation is total." The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's involvement in and
control over this case is no greater than that of other attorneys in similar cases.
The Court also finds that three of the factors cited by the South ridge Defendants
have been satisfied by Plaintiffs. Specifically, the Court finds that (1) there is no
evidence that the Ellises are not the true parties in interest as they are Lecstar
shareholders and were shareholders at the time the alleged wrongs in this case
occurred, (2) the Ellises are generally familiar with this litigation and have
demonstrated a willingness to learn more about the suit as evidenced by their
preparation for and attendance at the hearing on this motion, and (3) the Ellises
have shown personal commitment to this suit.
Demand Requirement
The South ridge Defendants argue that "the Ellises lack standing to bring a
derivative claim because they failed to comply with the statutory demand
requirement for bringing derivative claims." Under the Texas Business
Corporations Act a derivative proceeding cannot be commenced unless a
shareholder files a written demand, and waits ninety days for the corporation to
take suitable action or until the shareholder is notified that the demand has been
rejected by the corporation, unless the corporation is suffering irreparable injury
or such injury would result from waiting ninety days. V.AT.S. Bus. Corp. Act.
5.14 (c). As this Court ruled in its January 16, 2009 Order, previous demands
will "bind similarly situated shareholders making identical claims." Pace v.
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Jordan, 999 S.W.2d 615,621 (Tex. App. 1999). "Judicial economy demands
that identical claims, which in actuality belong to the corporation, be
simultaneously disposed of by one demand." Id. at 621. Here, the Ellises are in
the same position as Plaintiffs Thomas and McFarland. They are all
shareholders of Lecstar and are pursuing the same derivative claim on behalf of
the Corporation.
Statute of Limitations
The South ridge Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs should not be allowed
to add the Ellises as Plaintiffs because of a narrow exception under Georgia law
that would require the Court to apply the Texas statute of limitations and render
the Ellises' claim time barred. The South ridge Defendants note that while the
issue of relation back is generally a procedural issue governed by Georgia law,
an exception to this rule exists when "the limitation is established as a condition
precedent to the action by the statute which creates the cause of action." Gray v.
Armstrong, 222 Ga.App. 392,474 S.E.2d 280 (1996); See also Griffen v. Hunt
Refining Co., 292 Ga. App. 451 (2008). When the exception applies, the statute
of limitations of the state where the tort was committed governs so that here,
Texas law would control the procedural issue of relation back. The Southridge
Defendants argue that the demand requirement is such a "condition precedent."
While the demand requirement may be a condition precedent to a shareholder
derivative suit, it is not a [statute of] limitation. As it did in its January 16, 2009
Order, the Court finds that Georgia law prevails on the issue of relation back.
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Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c), relation back is allowed whenever
there is an identity of interests between the old and new parties so that it will not
create prejudice to the opposing party. If leave is sought to change or add
plaintiffs after the expiration of the statute of limitation, provided "the claim ...
asserted in the amended [complaint] arises out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original [complaint], the
amendment relates back to the date of the original [complaint]." Morris v.
Chewning, 201 Ga. App. 658, 659, (1991) (citing OCGA§ 9-11-15(c)).

The

Court finds that the Ellises share a unity of interest with Plaintiffs Thomas and
McFarland such that Defendants are not prejudiced and that the Ellises would be
asserting the same claims as originally asserted.
Conclusion
The Court finds that the Ellises were shareholders of Lecstar at the time
the acts complained of in the Complaint were committed and that the Ellises can
fairly and adequately represent the interests of Lecstar in a derivative suit.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion to Add S. Laird Ellis, III and Francois Ellis as
Plaintiffs is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this

\
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day of December, 2009.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta JUdicial Circuit
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Copies to:
Attorneys for First Empire Corporation. Alan B. Thomas. Jr.
Richard L. Tate
Libby King
Tate & Associates
206 South 2nd Street
Richmond, TX 77469
rltate@tate-Iaw.com
ebking@tate-Iaw.com
Mark F. Dehler
Michael E. Perez
Mark F. Dehler, LLC
201 Swanton Way
Decatur, GA 30030
(404) 371-1100
mark@dehlerlaw.com
Michael@dehlerlaw.com
John M. O'Quinn
John R. Leach III
Mike Meyer
THE O'QUINN LAW FIRM
440 Louisiana, Suite 2300
Houston, TX 77002
(713) 223-1000
Fax: 713-222-6903
pamb@oglaw.com
johnl@oglaw.com
James W. Christian
CHRISTIAN SMITH & JEWELL, LLP
2302 Fannin, Suite 500
Houston, TX 77002
713-659-7617
jwc@csj-Iaw.com
Kristin K. Reis
Tate Moerer & King, LLP
206 South Second Street
Richmond, Texas 77469
281-341-0077
281-341-1003 (facsimile)
www.tate-Iaw.com

Cache Capital (USA) LP
Cache Capital USA, L.P.
3440 Preston Ridge Road
Suite 600
Alpharetta, GA 3005

8

Attorneys for: Stephen M. Hicks,
South ridge Capital Management, LLC, McCormack Avenue, LTD
Lonnie L. Simpson
DLA PIPER US LLP
101 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 2000
Tampa, FL 33602-5149
(813) 222-5921
lonnie.simpson@dlapiper.com
Mark E. Grantham
Anthony D. Lehman
Job Seese
DLA PIPER US LLP
One Atlantic Center
1201 West Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309-3450
(404) 736-7800
Fax: 404-682-7800
Mark. Grantham@dlapiper.com
tony.lehman@dlapiper.com
job.seese@dlapiper.com
Perrie M. Weiner
Robert D. Weber
DLA PIPER US LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
4th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 595-3009
Fax: 310-595-3300
perrie. weiner@dlapiper.com
Robert.Weber@dlapiper.com
William B. Hill, Jr.
Joseph C. Sharp
ASHE, RAFUSE & HILL, LLP
1355 Peachtree Street, N. E.
Suite 500, South Tower·
Atlanta, GA 30309-3232
(404) 253-6025
williamhill@asherafuse.com
joesharp@asherafuse.com

Defendant John C. Canouse
Mr. John C. Canouse, CEO
JPC Capital Partners, Inc.
3440 Preston Ridge Road, Suite 600
Alpharetta, Georgia, 30005
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jack.canouse@jpccapital.com
(678) 469-9194 (mobile)
(770) 521.0259 (fax)
Defendant Dale W. Smith
Mr. Dale Smith
215 Carriage Way Lane
Roswell, Georgia 30076
678-373-0580(0)
770-310-0901 (C)
w.dalesmith@Yahoo.com
LecStar Corporation
LecStar Corporation
c/o Texas Secretary of State
Citations Unit
PO Box 12079
Austin, Texas 78711-2079
LTEL Corporation
Stephen Hicks
South ridge Capital Management, LLC
Sovereign Partners, LP
LTEL Holdings Corporation
90 Grove Street
Ridgefield, Connecticut 06877
LTEL Holdings Corporation
2 Ravinia Drive
Suite 1300
Atlanta, GA 30346
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq.
Durham Jones & Pinegar
111 East Broadway
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
jjones@djplaw.com
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